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Introduction
While Panama has a relatively high per
capita income ($4,630 in 2005) in relation to
Central and South American countries, it also
possesses one of the highest rich-poor income
gaps in the world. (“IDB: Country Strategy…,”
p. 2) Approximately 40 percent of the popula-
tion is in poverty while 17 percent of Panama’s
three million people live in a state of extreme
poverty. (“Interim Strategy…,” p. i) Panama’s
startling income gap is related to the dual
nature of its economy. The portion of the
Panamanian economy connected with the
Canal, the Colón Free Trade Zone, internation-
al business services, and the international 
banking sector has steadily increased in recent
years. While growth in the above industries has 
stimulated the country’s economic growth, 
a large portion of Panama’s population is
excluded from the above industries and remains
in the informal economy.1 (“IDB: Country
Strategy…,” p. i) Therefore, despite a prosper-
ous economy, Panama’s income disparity is
staggering. This is particularly evident among
Panama’s indigenous populations, 90 percent
of whom live below the poverty line. (“Interim
Strategy…,” p. 8) Indigenous peoples comprise
only 8 percent of Panama’s population but 19
percent of the country’s poor and 35 percent of
Panama’s extreme poor. (“Panama Poverty
Assessment…,” p. i) Therefore, in order for
Panama to address its income disparities, it
must address the plight of its indigenous pop-
ulations.
Panama has three primary indigenous
populations: the Ngobe-Bugle (also known as
the Guaymi), the Kuna, and the Embera-
Wounan. With a population of 150,000 in 2000,
the Ngobe-Bugle is the largest indigenous 
population in Panama. The Ngobe-Bugle 
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1The informal economy refers to the portion of the mar-
ket that is not regulated by the government and does not
comply with taxation procedures. Nor is it accounted for in
the country’s GDP. The formal economy refers to the por-
tion of the market that is recognized by the government,
adheres to taxation procedures, and is accounted for in the
GDP.
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Figure 1
Map of Panama’s Regions
Source: World Headquarters.
inhabit the mountainous provinces of Bocas del
Toro and Chiriqui in the west of Panama.
Because of the mountainous environment, the
Ngobe-Bugle communities are very small and
thinly strewn. (Vakis and Lindert, p. 2)
Consequently, access to social services such as
education and healthcare is very limited.
Furthermore, the Ngobe-Bugle have very little
access to potable drinking water. All of these
factors contribute to the disturbingly high rates
of malnutrition among this indigenous popu-
lation. According to the World Bank, 50 percent
of Ngobe-Bugle children are malnourished.
(Vakis and Lindert, p. 7) 
The Kuna are Panama’s second largest
indigenous population and numbered around
56,000 in 2000. The Kuna, also referred to as
the Tule, have inhabited the San Blas Islands
since the mid-1800s. (Wickstrom, p. 47) The
San Blas Islands are located in the Caribbean
very near the Panamanian coast. Approximately
50 percent of the Kuna still live on these islands
while around 50 percent have migrated to
either Panama City or Colón. (“Panama Poverty
Assessment…,” p. 6) The World Bank has
reported that, while 95 percent of Panama's
indigenous peoples live in poverty, only 65 per-
cent of Kuna living in indigenous territories are
below the poverty line. (Vakis and Lindert, p. 6)
However, though the statistics suggest a slight-
ly better standard of living, the Kuna still strug-
gle with malnutrition and poor health. 
The Embera-Wounan are the least numer-
ous and most remote indigenous population in
Panama. The Embera-Wounan live in the
extensive and densely forested Darien region
and the surrounding provinces. The Embera-
Wounan are semi-nomadic and rely on agri-
culture, hunting, and fishing. (Vakis and
Lindert, p. 2)
The Ngobe-Bugle, the Kuna, and the
Embera-Wounan all struggle with poor educa-
tion, malnutrition, and a lack of health services
associated with poverty. In this article I first dis-
cuss the efforts by both the Panamanian gov-
ernment and the international community to
reduce poverty in these indigenous populations.
I then direct specific attention to efforts to
improve the welfare of the Kuna of the San Blas
Islands.
Panama’s Previous Poverty-
Reduction Strategy
In 1998 President Ernesto Perez
Balladares’ administration developed a strate-
gy to reduce poverty in Panama. The strategy
was named “A New Strategic Approach to
Poverty” and contained the following goals: 
1. Increase access to education, potable 
water, healthcare, employment, sani-
tation services, electricity and tele-
phones, and social and community 
centers in poor communities;
2. Strengthen environmental protection;
3. Focus social spending on indigenous 
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populations and impoverished 
communities. (“Panama Poverty 
Assessment...,” p. 39; “Program for 
Poverty…,” pp. 3–4)
The third goal of the New Strategic
Approach was particularly significant. Despite
a relatively high rate of social spending (21 per-
cent of GDP in 1997), poverty among Panama’s
indigenous and poor populations was not
declining. Public expenditures in Panama are
extremely inequitable, with the non-poor ben-
efiting the most from governmental spending.
For example, whereas the poor comprised 43
percent of school-aged children in 1997, only
28 percent of total educational spending was
allocated to poor communities. Similarly,
although indigenous citizens totaled 10 percent
of Panama’s school-aged population, only 5 
percent of government education funds were
allocated to indigenous children. Finally, two-
thirds of educational spending was designated
to urban areas, even though only one-half of
the school-aged population lives in urban areas.
This disproportionate distribution of funds was
also the case with government spending on
infrastructure and healthcare. 
In its effort to implement the New
Strategic Approach, Panama was granted a
$289 million loan from the World Bank for
eight poverty reduction projects. These projects
covered road rehabilitation, educational devel-
opments, and health sector reforms. However,
before the New Strategic Approach could be
implemented there was a national presidential
election in Panama, and Balladares was
replaced by Mireya Moscoso as president. 
Moscoso’s advocacy for poverty alleviation
during her campaign provided hope that the
efforts of the Balladares administration would
not be lost; and initially these hopes were met.
The Moscoso administration adopted the plans
of the New Strategic Approach and joined with
the International Development Bank (IDB) to
implement them. The IDB lent the Republic of
Panama $48.85 million to be allocated towards
local investments and community develop-
ment. (“Program for Poverty…,” p. 1) Local
investments included infrastructure develop-
ment and social service projects related to
potable water, telephones, electricity, transport,
roads, education, sanitary services, and com-
munity centers. The focus of community devel-
opment was to utilize local knowledge by
involving indigenous communities in the plan-
ning and completion of projects.
In its efforts to target the most impover-
ished regions, the government classified all of
Panama’s communities into four levels of
poverty: level 1 signified a community in
extreme poverty; level 2, a community in pover-
ty; level 3, one in near poverty; and level 4, a
community that was not poor. These levels were
based on a community’s monthly per capita
income. Government finances from the IDB
loan were to be directed towards level 1 and
level 2 communities, which comprise 49 per-
cent of Panama’s population and essentially all
of Panama’s indigenous populations. (“Program
for Poverty…,” p. 7)
After level 1 and level 2 communities were
identified, the government accepted formal
petitions from these communities for infra-
structure and social service projects. There
were several disadvantages for indigenous com-
munities inherent in this selection process. For
example, language barriers and a lack of polit-
ical organization made drafting formal petitions
to the government more difficult for indige-
nous peoples. 
Despite some weaknesses, the New
Strategic Approach was a comprehensive strat-
egy for poverty alleviation, at least in theory.
Unfortunately, however, it met with very limit-
ed success. The Moscoso administration con-
tinued Panama’s high rates of social spending
(20.2 percent of GDP), but most resources were
not reallocated to level 1 and level 2 commu-
nities. Furthermore, although the $289 million
loan from the World Bank was intended for
eight poverty alleviation projects, the Moscoso
administration only pursued three of the 
projects. Stephanie Wickstrom, professor at
Central Washington University, described
President Moscoso as being “a master at speak-
ing the language of indigenous rights and sus-
tainable development while not doing much to
empower indigenous peoples.” (Wickstrom, 
p. 43) The acceptance of the New Strategic
Approach proved only to be lip service by the
Moscoso administration. Consequently
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Panama’s poverty rate among indigenous 
populations remained high through the
Moscoso presidency. 
Yet another change in administration
offered hope of a renewed poverty reduction
effort in indigenous territories when current
President Martin Torrijos Espino took office in
2004. The question remains, however: Is the
new administration addressing the issues of
Panama’s poorest, the Ngobe-Bugle, Embera-
Wounan, and Kuna? The following sections
address this question.
Panama’s Current Poverty Reduction
Strategy
Upon taking office in 2004, President
Martin Torrijos Espino’s administration devel-
oped a new poverty reduction strategy entitled
“A Strategic Vision of the Economic and
Employment Development towards 2009.”
Panama’s new poverty reduction strategy builds
on some of the strengths of the New Strategic
Approach, such as the emphasis on communi-
ty involvement and infrastructure development.
However, unlike the previous plan, the
Strategic Vision places a stronger emphasis on
poverty reduction in indigenous populations.
The new plan has set four goals for 2005–2009
that directly affect indigenous populations.
These goals are:
1. To reduce indigenous poverty from 98 
percent to 80 percent;
2. To reduce infant mortality from 20.6 
per thousand live births to 15
3. To increase life expectancy in 
comarcas2 from 65 years to 70 years; 
4. To reduce the number of people living 
in poverty and extreme poverty from 
40 out of 100 to 32 out of 100. 
(“Interim Strategy…,” p. 12)
The Panamanian government expects to
reach the first and fourth goals by incorporat-
ing the indigenous populations into the formal
economy through micro-finance and bilingual
cross-culture education and by developing a
social protection program. (“Interim
Strategy…,” pp. 33–34)
Micro-finance is the funding of very small
businesses through modest loans. Previous
efforts in Ngobe-Bugle suggest that micro-
finance is a viable means of reducing poverty in
Panama’s indigenous populations. For exam-
ple, through the Project for the Development
of the Ngobe-Bugle Communities initiated in
1994, rural and indigenous inhabitants were
taught how to start and manage a small com-
pany. From 1997 to the completion of the pro-
ject in 2001, 395 micro-businesses were estab-
lished. Some of the companies sold chickens,
scholastic uniforms, organic agricultural pro-
duce, and coffee. Micro-finance initiatives are
beneficial because they meet a need in the com-
munity, develop sustainable ways of making a
profit, and integrate the population into the for-
mal economy.
In addition to micro-finance, the Strategic
Vision proposes bilingual education as a means
of reducing indigenous poverty. A World Bank
study in 2000 reported that education is high-
ly correlated with poverty status: the higher
one’s education, the lower the probability of
one’s being poor. (Vakis and Lindert, p. 17) On
average, each additional year of education 
produces a five-percent increase in hourly 
earnings. (“Panama Poverty Assessment…,” 
p. 12) The same World Bank study found that
fewer people involved in the formal economy
experience poverty than those involved in the
informal economy. Bilingual education increas-
es the probability that a person will enter the
formal economy while also preserving the 
community’s culture. Consequently the gov-
ernment plans on increasing the number of
preschools and secondary schools and also on
improving the facilities of already existing
schools in indigenous regions. (“IDB: Country
Strategy…,” p. 24) The Strategic Vision also
includes a social protection system that pro-
vides monetary subsidies to families living in
extreme poverty. (“Interim Strategy…,” p. 34)
Because a large portion of this target pop-
ulation is indigenous, the social protection sys-
tem will potentially benefit indigenous people.
In addition to providing subsidies, the govern-
ment will financially support programs that
combat poverty by teaching marketable skills
and providing social services. (“Interim
Strategy…,” p. 34) For example, the govern-
ment may provide financial grants to vocation-
2Comarcas are lands legally recognized by the govern-
ment as being owned by an indigenous population. 
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al schools located in indigenous communities.
Currently there are very few vocational schools
in comarcas, although one does operate in
Ngobe-Bugle. Students at a vocational school
can learn domestic services, construction, agro-
culture and forestry, and administration of sus-
tainable farm lands. (Gomez, “Un Centro…”)
Financial support for vocational schools in
Panama’s indigenous communities is desper-
ately needed.
Panama’s Cooperation with the IDB
In order to accomplish the goals outlined
in the Strategic Vision, the Torrijos adminis-
tration has joined with the IDB and the World
Bank. The IDB intends to coordinate with
Panama to reduce poverty by increasing the
economy’s competitive power and by building
human capital (technical skills and knowledge
of the labor force). (“IDB: Country Strategy…,”
p. i) 
One way that the IDB and Panama hope
to boost the economy’s competitiveness is by
strengthening basic infrastructure. (“IDB:
Country Strategy…,” p. 17) The IDB specifically
aims to increase the availability of potable water
and sanitation services in indigenous territo-
ries. The government also aspires to broaden
access to electricity and expand hydroelectric
power generation. This process has already
begun. In 2006, the IDB approved a $30 million
loan to Panama for a rural electrification pro-
gram that will expand services to many uncov-
ered areas. The loan will encourage the private
sector to provide electricity to Panama’s poor-
est communities. The IDB will also coordinate
with Panama to develop tourism and agricul-
tural exports. Furthermore, the IDB and the
Torrijos administration will make distinct
efforts to include indigenous populations in
these sectors. (“IDB: Country Strategy…,” 
pp. 17–19) 
In addition to improving the competitive-
ness of Panama’s economy, the government
also seeks to build human capital. The govern-
ment plans on expanding social services and
making them more accessible to the indigenous
populations. For example, the government will
provide nutritional services to children two
years old and younger and to pregnant women
in indigenous provinces. (“IDB: Country
Strategy…,” p. 23) Such improvements in
social health services are particularly needed
in indigenous areas where 40 to 50 percent of
the population is malnourished. (Vakis and
Lindert, p. 7) 
Panama’s Cooperation with the 
World Bank
In addition to collaborating with the IDB,
the Panamanian government has proposed to
join the World Bank in enacting the Strategic
Vision. The World Bank will partner with
Panama to evaluate current poverty levels,
monitor infrastructure projects, and determine
target areas for future projects. Additionally,
the Panamanian government has proposed a
$100 million World Bank loan for three pover-
ty-reduction projects in 2007. Thirty-five mil-
lion dollars will be allocated to rural poverty-
reduction, $30 million to water supply and
sanitation in low income communities, and
$35 million to a social protection project.
(“IDB: Country Strategy…,” pp. 21–22) 
In March 2007 the rural productivity 
project was approved by the World Bank. The
objective of the project is to increase the pro-
ductivity of rural small-scale producers by cre-
ating an alliance between these producers and
commercial partners. The goals of the project
are to increase sales of small-scale farmers by
25 percent and increase net revenues for small-
scale farmers by 40 percent. The loan will
finance the fixed capital, working capital, and
technical assistance needed. 
The second project that Panama proposed
to the World Bank involves the improvement
of water supply and sanitation services. Water
and sanitation are inadequate throughout most
of Panama, but are particularly so in Panama’s
indigenous communities. In 2004 only 56 per-
cent of indigenous peoples had access to
potable water, and those who had access faced
frequent interruptions. (“Water Supply…”)
Moreover, while sanitation services cover
approximately 94 percent of people in rural
provinces, such services are available to only
39 percent of peoples in indigenous territories.
Progress in improving water and sanitation
services in indigenous regions is greatly 
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hindered by governmental inefficiency.
Currently many state agencies are involved in
water and sanitation services. These agencies
provide services to overlapping regions while
other provinces are entirely ignored.
Because of Panama’s inadequate water and
sanitation coverage, the current administration
aims to increase rural water coverage from 75
percent in 2004 to 82 percent in 2009 with the
loan from the World Bank. First, Panama pro-
posed that most of the loan funds be allocated
to indigenous and rural communities. Second,
Panama proposed that MINSA, Panama’s pri-
mary water and sanitation agency in rural
areas, implement the programs in indigenous
provinces. The plan’s greatest weakness is that
it does not allocate sufficient funds to improve
sanitation services in indigenous populations
living in remote communities (i.e., the Ngobe-
Bugle, Kuna, and Embera-Wounan). (“Water
Supply…”) 
The third project planned by the World
Bank and the Panamanian government is the
social protection project. The primary compo-
nent of the project is a conditional cash trans-
fer (CCT) that provides cash to families living
in extreme poverty. The purpose of the CCT is
to enable families to invest in their children’s
education and to improve healthcare and nutri-
tion for pregnant mothers. Currently the CCT
program is being implemented in approxi-
mately 10,000 households with the goal of
eventually reaching 50,000. In addition to
establishing the CCT program, the loan will
also financially support agencies that help
indigenous families gain access to proper iden-
tification documents and educate communities
what social programs are available. 
All in all, the Strategic Vision is an
advanced poverty-reduction strategy. Unlike the
former New Strategic Approach, the Strategic
Vision contains specific goals for Panama’s
indigenous populations and proposes ways of
meeting these goals through micro-finance,
bilingual education initiatives, and a condi-
tional cash transfer program. Furthermore,
Panama’s loans from the IDB and the World
Bank suggest that the Panamanian government
has the financial support to implement the
Strategic Vision. However, any comprehensive
poverty reduction strategy is doomed to fail if
it is not a high priority item on the political
agenda. The previous administration demon-
strated that a comprehensive strategy and 
support by the World Bank and IMF are not suf-
ficient to reduce poverty. Thus far, the number
of infrastructure and social projects being
implemented suggests that the Torrijos gov-
ernment is actively trying to combat poverty.
The Kuna
A 2000 study conducted by the World
Bank found that indigenous communities with
high levels of social capital have greater suc-
cess lobbying the government and nongovern-
mental organizations for aid. (Vakis and
Lindert, p. 15) In fact, communities that have
high levels of social capital3 are four times more
likely to receive government aid and two times
more likely to receive assistance from non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) than
indigenous and non-indigenous communities
with low social capital. For the past 80 years
social organization has been one of the great-
est strengths of the Kuna. According to
O’Donnell-Morales, “By using local levels of
government to ensure representation at the
national level, the Kuna set an example of suc-
cessful indigenous activism for the rest of Latin
America.” (O’Donnell-Morales, p. 37) 
The General Kuna Congress (GKC) is the
basis of Kuna political organization. The GKC
meets semiannually and is comprised of five
delegates (caciques generales) from each of the
forty-eight Kuna communities. During the con-
gressional meetings the leaders discuss threats
to Kuna society, such as ecological degradation,
urban migration, and malnutrition. However,
in recent years the GKC has largely focused on
strategies to reduce the poverty level among the
Kuna. Three areas in which the Kuna have
united to reduce poverty are bilingual educa-
tion, sustainable development, and the mola
trade.
3Social capital is defined as community norms and net-
works that facilitate cooperation, such as churches, frater-
nal organizations, sports, educational boards, and the like.
(Vakis and Lindert, p. 15) 
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Bilingual Education
As previously discussed, education is neg-
atively correlated with poverty. Unfortunately,
a lack of schools and the absence of bilingual
education have prevented Kuna from entering
formal labor and product markets. As a conse-
quence, the GKC began to lobby the
Panamanian government in 2001 for bilingual
education and more schools on the San Blas
Islands. According to Panamanian law, all
indigenous communities are entitled to receive
bilingual education that integrates the cur-
riculum with the culture of the indigenous pop-
ulation. After lobbying for several years, the
GKC coordinated with the Panamanian gov-
ernment to implement a bilingual education
program on the islands in 2004. (“Proyecto
Implementación…”) The Kuna use cassettes,
CDs, cameras, videos, and other technology as
aids for the bilingual education program. They
also distribute scholastic texts and pamphlets
on the islands. (Hernández) The new program
incorporates the history, art, and culture of the
Kuna as well as aspects of the Panamanian
national curriculum. Additionally, the program
plans to increase intercultural connections
between the Kuna and other indigenous 
populations in Panama. (“Proyecto
Implementación…”) Additionally, another
milestone for Kuna bilingual education was
achieved in 2005 when the Kuna alphabet was
recorded for the first time. (Tapia) However,
despite these advances, there is still a need for
more schools, better supplies, and trained
teachers. (“Proyecto Implementación…”)
Sustainable Development
A lack of education is one of the Kuna’s
greatest hindrances to overcoming poverty.
Degradation of the environment is another.
Like Panama’s other indigenous populations,
the Kuna suffer from malnutrition. One signif-
icant factor contributing to the high malnutri-
tion rates is the breakdown of coral reefs on the
San Blas Islands caused by overfishing by the
Kuna as well as coral mining. Sedimentation
from deforested areas also corrodes the coral
reefs. Traditionally the Kuna have relied on fish-
ing as one of their primary food sources as well
as one of their primary means of earning an
income. Consequently, the degradation of the
coral reefs is particularly harmful. In response
to this ecological breakdown, the Kuna have
formed approximately thirty organizations ded-
icated to sustainable development. One exam-
ple is the Institute of Integral Development of
the Kuna Yala that develops strategies to sus-
tain ecological development. Association
Napguana is another organization that supports
development projects within the San Blas
Islands through financial, administrative, and
legal assistance. One project currently imple-
mented by Association Napguana is UA GALU.
The objective of UA GALU is to teach Kuna fish-
ermen how to fish using traditional methods
without destroying the coral reefs. Association
Napguana also offers free legal services to those
in the Kuna community who cannot afford
legal consultation. The Kuna utilize their
NGOs, such as Association Napguana, to lobby
the Panamanian government and the interna-
tional community for financial assistance. For
example, one Kuna NGO, the Center of Popular
Legal Assistance, joined forces with the World
Conservation Union to draft sustainable devel-
opment plans, to educate the population on
healthy environmental practices, and to form
laws that regulate destructive activity.
The Mola Cooperative
Perhaps one of the Kuna’s most success-
ful organizations is the mola cooperative. Molas
are the decorative handiwork of Kuna women.
They take the form of embroidered blouses,
shirts, and tapestries. Selling molas is one way
the Kuna are involved in the cash economy and
is one of the more important sources of income
for the Kuna along with agriculture and fish-
ing. Many women partially or completely sup-
port their children’s educations through mola
sales. The mola cooperative came about as a
response to the commercialization of molas in
the 1960s. Kuna women were frustrated with
the large profits that middlemen acquired
through mola sales. Consequently, the Kuna
women organized to lower the cost of supplies
and to develop a more comprehensive system
to sell molas. (Tice, p. 103) The Kuna’s success
at entering the cash economy is commendable;
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however, mola sales are currently still not suf-
ficient to lift the Kuna out of poverty.
Furthermore, mola sales are extremely vulner-
able to shifts in the tourism trade.
Conclusion
Despite a growing economy, 95 percent of
Panama’s indigenous population is impover-
ished. If Panama intends to reduce poverty
within its indigenous communities, the gov-
ernment must have a comprehensive strategy
and be prepared to pursue it. Currently the
Torrijos administration appears willing to pro-
vide more than lip service to reducing poverty.
Not only does the New Strategic Approach
develop a method of tackling indigenous pover-
ty through micro-finance, bilingual education,
and CCT transfers, but projects funded by the
IDB and the World Bank are already being
implemented. Nonetheless, because poverty
reduction is a long-term goal, the plight of the
poor, and the indigenous more specifically,
must be on the political agenda of future
administrations if Panama is to experience any
sustainable success in reducing poverty.
Figure 2
Mola
Source: Molas of the Kuna Indians.
